ABSTRACT Computing the ratio of secure summations (RSS) is one of the most important tools for privacy preserving distributed data mining. It refers to such a problem; given the n parties and their respective secret values (x i ,y i ), where i = 1, . . . , n, how can they get the value of
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I. INTRODUCTION
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) [17] , [25] , [27] is an important approach for privacy preserving distributed data mining (PPDDM) [3] , [13] , [14] , [29] , [30] . Based on SMC, different data owners can implement computation of useful aggregate statistics over the entire dataset without revealing additional information. Among the numerous protocols for SMC, computing the ratio of secure summations(RSS) [24] is one of the most frequently-used tools in PPDDM. It is often utilized to build different models in a privacy preserving distributed environment(PPDE), e.g. K-Means clustering model [9] , [19] , [21] , EM clustering model [11] , [23] , Naive Bayes classifier [10] , [12] , [28] , and some useful framework for social data analysis [1] , [22] , [26] , and so on. Under the assumption of certain security, these models can be constructed securely in PPDE only relying on RSS. Therefore, a secure and efficient RSS protocol is very important for the research of PPDDM. In order to be consistent
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Specially, RSS refers to a SMC protocol by which n participants (P 1 , ..., P n ) can calculate the value of ratio n i=1 x i / n i=1 y i privately, where (x i , y i ) is a pair of secret data only hold by P i . During the whole protocol process, neither (x i , y i ) is revealed to any party other than P i , nor the values of n i=1 x i and n i=1 y i are disclosed to any party. Thus, the methods that participants obtain n i=1 x i and n i=1 y i based on ''secure multi-party summation'' protocol [15] , [20] firstly, and then the ratio n i=1 x i / n i=1 y i cannot satisfy the privacy requirement of RSS. However, due to the privacy restrictions on n i=1 x i and n i=1 y i , a method that it is not only secure under the assumption of semi-honest, but also can resist collusion attacks from any n − 1 parties can be found for RSS. In this paper, collusion attack is referred to as the situation that a part of participants, after executing the protocol honestly, work together to deduce additional information of non-collusion parties using information obtained during the whole process of collaboration.
There are three main kinds of methods for RSS. The first is to convert the required ratio n i=1 x i / n i=1 y i into its logarithmic form exp(ln( n i=1 x i ) − ln( n i=1 y i )), and then seek the result based on ''secure two-party logarithm'' [27] . Based on this equivalent transformation, Vaidya and Kantarcioglu [10] presents an approach for RSS. Although this method is secure under the assumption of semi-honest, it cannot resist collusion attack. The second is based on the idea of multiplicative disturbance [2] . Participants first obtain a pair of disturbed summations d · n i=1 x i and d · n i=1 y i , and then get the ratio required by division, where d is a random multiplier constructed by all participants but unknown by any participant. Based on the idea, Du and Atallah [7] presents a solution for the case where there are only two participants. However, this method cannot be extended to scenarios where the number of parties n is greater than two. Although the approach in [24] is applicable to the case where n is larger or equal to 3, the random multiplier d constructed based on this method can only be an integer. As we know, the probability of any two integers being relatively-prime is approximately equal to 6/π 2 . This means that the multiplier d can be found with a high probability by seeking the greatest common divisor (GCD)
or y i is a floating-point number with finite precision. The third is based on homomorphic technology and threshold cryptosystem [4] , [5] , by which many arithmetic operations can be done securely. For the problem RSS, participants first cooperate to get the encryptions of n i=1 x i and n i=1 y i based on Paillier public-key cryptosystem [18] , and then obtain the encryption of the integer part of n i=1 x i / n i=1 y i locally according to the method presented in [16] . At last, participants decrypt the encryption of ratio by cooperative computation based on threshold encryption and get the result required. The process is secure, but it requires a trusted third party(TTP) to setup the keys for the threshold cryptosystem. However, such a TTP may be hard to find in some real environments.
It is difficult for the first kind of methods to resist collusion attack. Methods based on homomorphic technology and threshold cryptosystem cannot be applied to some actual cases with high security requirements. However, these limitations can be eliminated by using multiplicative disturbance. Therefore, in this paper, we present our method for RSS based on the idea of multiplicative disturbance. However, unlike the method in [24] , the random multiplier constructed based on our method is not generated over integer Ring Z but rational number filed F. Thus theoretically, when there is no additional information, the participants cannot determine the true values of • The running time with respect to each participant is O(n).
• Different from the method given in [7] , our new approach can be applied to cases with more than one participant, so it can be used more widely.
• Our method is symmetrical, and thus is fair. This means that each participant plays a same role and executes same operations as others, which is very important for a SMC protocol since it ensures that each participant gets equal benefits and takes the same risks as well. What's more, the new method can defense collusion attack, even if there are n − 1 conspirators. That is, no participant in our method needs to worry about his/her privacy being stolen, which greatly ease their concerns for cooperation. Due to the above advantages, our method can meet the needs of practical application in terms of security, efficiency and extendibility at the same time. Since our method determines the ratio based on Multiplicative Disturbance in which the multiplier used for disturbing is a rational number, it is referred to as ''RSS Based on Rational Number Multiplicative Disturbance'' (RSS-RMD) hereafter.
The rest of this paper is organized as follow. In section 2, the existing methods are described in detail. Section 3 introduces our new method and gives strict mathematical proofs of its security. In section 4, based on our new method for RSS, we will construct naive Bayes classifiers in PPDE. Experimental results are shown in section 5. Section 6 concludes our work with some future research directions.
II. RELATED WORK
RSS is formulated firstly in [24] . Its mathematical expression is shown as follow.
There are n participants, and each of them owns a pair of input:
Now they want to know the value of In a distributed environment, construction of many data mining models can be boiled down to RSS. So, a lot of research has been conducted on it in recent years. In [10] , the ratio
. Thus the participants just need to calculate the value of z = ln(
y i ) based on secure two-party logarithm protocol (STL) [27] . However, STL is only applicable to the case n = 2. Specifically, in order to find the value of z, P 1 and P n are arranged to get the random shares (sx 1 , sy 1 ) and (sx n , sy n ) respectively, where sx 1 + sx n = n i=1 x i and sy 1 + sy n = n i=1 y i . Once (sx 1 , sy 1 ) and (sx n , sy n ) are obtained, P 1 and P n can calculate the value of z and the ratio required using the STL protocol. Share it, then all the participants obtain the result at last. It is not hard to prove that this approach is secure under the assumption of semi-honest, but when there is collusion between P 1 and P n , they can obtain the VOLUME 7, 2019 two summations. This is to say, the method cannot defense collusion attacks and does not apply to the case where any participant may not trust any other party. At the same time, it is not fair to (P 2 , ..., P n−1 ).
Du and Atallah [7] gives a simple and convenient method to realize RSS for case where there are only two participants involved. In this approach, P 1 first generates two random numbers r 1 and r 2 , and then sends r 2 /r 1 to P 2 . Once received r 2 /r 1 , P 2 and P 1 work together to make P 2 get the values of r 1 * (x 1 +x 2 ) and r 2 * (y 1 +y 2 ) based on secure dot-production protocol [6] , [8] . At last, P 2 calculates the ratio (r 2 /r 1 )*(r 1 * (x 1 + x 2 ))/(r 2 * (y 1 + y 2 )) and shares it with P 1 . Although the random multipliers r 1 and r 2 are not equal, they can be eliminated securely, and then the ratio can be calculated correctly. While this method is simple, it cannot be extended to the case where n is greater than two.
In [24] , based on the idea of multiplicative disturbance,
y i by cooperation, where d is random number unknown by any party. Then the ratio can be easily got by division. Although this method is fair, there are several serious security flaws as follows:
• The random number d used to cover the summations is an integer. While for any two integers, they are relatively-prime with probability of about 6/π 2 . This means that if • Each participant, denoted by P i , is required to send (b i,1 x i , . . . , b i,n x i ), which are disturbed values of x i by different multiplier, to participants P 1 , . . . , P n correspondingly in the process. Thus when there are k participants working together, the specific value of x i can be obtained with a higher probability. Therefore, the method cannot withstand the collusion attack actually.
• In practice, it is very likely that the RSS protocol may be called many times by one application and the value of By calculating the GCD of them, the value of |D| can be determined. Although the method in [24] is fair to each participant, but the potential security risks may causes serious privacy issues with high probability. When part of participants conspired, input of other parties could even be stolen with ease.
Based on protocol secure two-party integer division, which is presented in [16] , the problem RSS can be solved with no difficulty. However, a threshold cryptosystem with additive and multiplicative homomorphism is needed to construct before finding the ratio. Concomitantly, each participant needs to get a pair of key about the cryptosystem, denoted by (P k , s i ),i=1,. . . ,n, where P k is the public-key used for encryption, and s i is a share of private-key corresponding to P k . Only when more than a certain number of participants cooperate, data encrypted can be successfully decrypted. There are two approaches presented in [4] and [5] to generate the keys (P k , s i ),i = 1, . . . , n, namely, by a trusted third party, or by some general purpose SMC. In general, time complexity of the general purpose SMC is often too high to applicable to practical application, and a trusted third party is hard to find in some specific environments. This means that the threshold cryptosystem, which is basis of the approach presented in [16] , is difficult to construct when high security is demanded. Therefore, this method has certain limitation in the real world.
To summarize, there is still no effective method for RSS that can meet the needs of practical application in terms of both security and efficiency at the same time. However, the protocol RSS are needed when constructing some data mining models in PPDE with certain security requirements. Therefore, it is necessary for us to find a new secure and efficient method for RSS.
For convenience, in the following chapters, we call the method presented in [10] ''RSS Based on Ln (RSS-LN)'', the method presented in [11] ''RSS Only Applicable to Two-Party (RSS-TWO)'', the method presented in [24] ''RSS Based on Integer Multiplicative Disturbance (RSS-IMD)'', and the method presented in [19] ''RSS Based on Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem (RSS-PHC)''. In addition, we refer to these specific methods as the corresponding protocols without distinction in this paper.
III. RATIO OF SECURE SUMMATIONS
In this section, a new method for RSS is proposed. We describe our method in detail first. Then a theoretical guarantee of the security of the method is provided mathematically. Afterwards, in-depth analysis on its computational complexity, communication complexity and extendibility are carried out respectively.
A. OUR NEW METHOD: RSS-RMD
The reason why the method presented in [24] is insecure mainly lies in that the multiplier for disturbance is an integer, which allows attackers to obtain it by seeking the GCD of the two disturbed summations. Therefore, a random number R over rational number field F is introduced to cover n i=1 x i and n i=1 y i in our method. At the same time, the inputs also should be converted into values on F. Thus when there is no additional information, the value of R cannot be uniquely determined just based on the disturbed summations R· n i=1 x i and R · n i=1 y i in theory. Generally, in practical application, the value of secret data x i or y i is either an integer or a limited-precision floating-point number (LFN). For these two different cases, we provide corresponding solutions in the following sub-sections.
1) DETAILED STEPS OF RSS-RMD
Before introducing our method RSS-RMD in detail, each participant is assumed to have a pair of keys (pk i , pr i ), i = 1, . . . , n for Paillier public-key cryptosystem, where pk i is the public key and pr i is the private key of P i . When x i and y i are both integers, RSS-RMD is described as follow:
Step 1: Each participant modifies their secret inputs.
where α i is a rational number randomly generated and its valve is between [−0.5,0.5].
Step 2: Each participant generates a set of random rational numbers.
Step 3: For i from 1 to n, P i calculates f i,1 * r i , . . . , f i,n * r i and rounds them to the nearest integers which are recorder as
Then encrypt these integers Based on Paillier Encryption System and send (e
Step 4:
) based on additive and multiplicative homomorphic property of Paillier Encryption System, where i = 1, . . . , n. Afterwards, send re i,j and g j,i back to P i correspondingly.
Step 5: For i from 1 to n, P i decrypts re i,j , and divides the decryption result by f i,j * g j,i . Thus every participant obtains the information as following:
In addition, each participant also holds the following information:
Obviously, as long as f i,j and g j,i are big enough relative to r i and x j respectively, the following equation below can be established
Step 6: For i from 1 to n, P i generates a rational number ϕ i randomly whose value is between [−0.5,0.5]. Then calculates
and share it with others. Let r i be much bigger than ϕ i . Then every participant can get the approximation value of disturbed summation:
Step 7: In the same way, each participant can get
Step 8: At last, all the participants obtain
When x i or y i is a floating-point number with limitedprecision, participants can agree on a fixed number k, and multiply their input with 10 k . Generally, k is the number of valid digits after decimal point. After that, use 10 k * x i as input, the approximation of (10 k * x i ) can be obtained following the same steps as above.
2) AN EXAMPLE WITH THREE PARTIES
In this section, we give an example with three participants whose inputs are P 1 : (118, 322), P 2 : (266, 558), P 3 : (211, 629). For simplicity, we only present the process of seeking
, we give the result directly. The length of public key is 128 bits.
VOLUME 7, 2019
Step 1: Modify the inputs. Step 2: Generate the parameters. Step 8: Get the ratio
parameters for seeking
For the secret inputs, the true value of n i=1 x i / n i=1 y i is 0.394301, so the difference is about 0.00061.
3) DISCUSSIONS
In practice, in order to get more exact result and prevent attacks from some malicious parties, three aspects need to be noted.
• To make [ • The inputs need to be modified in step1. So, when the value of n i=1 x i is not big enough to n i=1 α i , the difference between result obtained based on RSS-RMD and the true value of n i=1 x i / n i=1 y i maybe not negligible. The same problem exists for y i . For the example above, the difference is mainly due to the modification of inputs in the first step. Consequently, according to the protocol given above, the ratio n i=1 x i / n i=1 y i can be obtained securely by the participants whether the inputs are integers or LFNs.
B. COLLUSION ATTACK DEFENSE
As mentioned above, RSS-RMD is fair-each participant plays an equal role in the protocol. In this way, in order to prove that our method can resist collusion attacks, we just need to prove that (P 2 , . . . , P n ) cannot steal the value of (x 1 , y 1 ) only using the information obtained during the process of cooperation.
Theorem 1 (x 1 , y 1 ) Cannot be Found by(P 2 , . . . , P n ): We prove this theorem in two steps. In step 1, given a value of r 1 , a corresponding value of (x 1 , y 1 ) can be obtained. In step2, for different value of r 1 , the integer parts of x 1 and y 1 are not fixed. (x i , y i ) here refers to the input modified in step1. During the whole implementation process of RSS-RMD, all information get by (P 2 , . . . , P n ) that can be used to guess x 1 is as follows:
In step3 of RSS-RMD:
In step4-5 of RSS-RMD:
In step6 of RSS-RMD:
(share 1,j + share 1,j )
Since the information about r 1 in equations (10) is encrypted, and nobody has the private key pr 1 other than P 1 , the equations (10) cannot be used by the attackers (P 2 , . . . , P n ). According to equations (11), we can get that:
By substituting it into equation (12), equation (12) can be rewritten as follow:
Let
where = o(0.5) as long as f j,1 and g 1,j are big enough. For any given value of r 1 , in order to determine the value of ϕ 1 is in [−0.5,0.5], the following inequation should be satisfied:
This is to say, for any given value of r 1 , a pair of (x 1 , ϕ 1 ) which satisfies equation (11), (12) can be found. Similarly, a pair of (y 1 , ϕ 1 ) also can be guessed based on the information obtained in the process of seeking n i=1 r i y i . Next, we need prove that the integer parts of x 1 and y 1 are not fixed with the change of r 1 . That is not hard.
To make the value of x 1 satisfies the inequality (18) , let x 1 = s/ n j=1 r j . According to equation (15), we can get that
Because values of s 1 , n j=2
, n j=2 share j,1 are all know to (P 2 , . . . , P n ), let
then
From equation (21), we can see that the integer part of x 1 can be changed by adjusting the value of r 1 .
Illustrated by the example in Section (3.1.2), information about (r 1 , x 1 ) obtained by P 2 , P 3 in step(4-6) is y 1 , r 1 , ϕ 1 , ϕ 1 ) , we can get the difference from table.1. Put the guessed values to the right side of equation (12), then one result can be get which is equal to the value of s 1 received during the solution process with certainty. Since Paillier cryptosystem is a probabilistic asymmetric algorithm for public key cryptography, even if the same information is encrypted with the same public key, the result may be different. That is, equation (10) cannot be used to verify the guessed value.
So far, we have proved that the attackers (P 2 , ..., P n ) cannot calculate the value of (x 1 , y 1 ) from the perspective of theory and living examples. Compared with the method presented in [24] , the random multiplier is constructed over rational number F rather than integral ring Z, which theoretically avoids finding the true summations by seeking the GCD. Thus the privacy can be preserved well. Because RSS-RMD can resist collusion attack from n − 1 malicious parties, no participant need to worry about leakage of his/her own input.
C. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY
In addition to security, computational complexity and communication complexity are also the key factors to measure the performance of the method for RSS.
For computational complexity, Paillier encryptions and decryptions are quite time consuming, while other operation can be ignored in RSS-RMD. Specifically, there are n − 1 encryption operations in step3, n − 1 homomorphic addition operations, and n−1 homomorphic multiplication operations in step4, and n − 1 decryption operations in step5 involved with respect to each participant.
For communication complexity, a star network like Figure 1 is assumed to be adopt to connect each participant. Thus the information needed to be transmitted during the whole process is
, and s i Based on the analysis above, it can be seen that, the computational complexity and communication complexity involved by each participant are both O(n) in RSS-RMD.
D. EXTENDIBILITY
In the real world, it is common for a participant to join or quit. So, when the existing model needs to be updated for better performance, some information in RSS-RMD needs to be recalculated.
• When some participant quits, e.g. P 1 , the remaining parties can easily get the ratio n i=2 x i / n i=2 y i based on the information they have obtained. Specially, party P i only needs to recalculate s i at step 6. that is s i = j =i,j =1 (share i,j + share j,i ) + (r i + ϕ i ) * x i and then share it.
• When a new participant joins, denoted by P n+1 , in order to get new ratio only  (share n+1,j , share n+1,j ) and (share j,n+1 , share j,n+1 ) , j = 1, . . . , n need to be calculated.
Thus it can be seen that regardless of the withdrawal of parties or the participation of new parties in RSS, most of the information calculated between participants need not be recomputed. This feature greatly enhances the scalability of the method and has important implications in practical applications. For example, if P 1 is required to quit for its malicious behavior which has be found by other participants, the intermediate result between other participants do not need to be recalculated; and when some new parties join, the information generated by the original parties is also valid. Similarly, when input of some participant, e.g. P 1 , is changed, only information related to (x 1 , y 1 ) needs to be recalculated.
E. COMPARISON OF METHODS
When there is a problem with the methods' security, it is of little significance to underline their other advantages. So, we first compare our method with existing methods in security, and then applicability and fairness. In Table. 2, a method is considered secure if it can resist collusion attacks and no trusted third party is required. From Table. 2, we can see that only RSS-RMD can meet the demands in terms of security, scalability, and fairness at the same time. What is more, it is also acceptable when considering computational complexity and communication complexity.
IV. AN APPLICATION OF RSS
We present an application of RSS in PPDDM in this section by constructing a Naive Bayes classifier in PPDE. To facilitate the narrative, several related notations are given in Table 3 , and only data with discrete attribute values is considered. 
A. NAIVE BAYES CLASSIFIER
Naive Bayes is a simple but powerful baseline classifier. It is often used for text classification such as spam recognition.
For a sample with discrete attribute x =< x 1 , ..., x d >, the Naive Bayes classifier can be expressed as follow:
where
In order to obtain h nb (x), all the P(c) and P(x i |c) must be obtained firstly. In PPDE, sample set is distributed across different data sites. In this case, calculating P(c) and P(x i |c) is converted into a RSS problem.
B. CONSTRUCTION OF NAIVE BAYES CLASSIFIER IN PPDE
In PPDE, assuming there are no duplicates between participants, then equation (23) can be obtained as follow:
and equation (24) can also be found in this way:
Using the method RSS-RMD, both (25) and (26) can be obtained securely. Then, based on the results, Naive Bayes classifier on total sample set D can be easily constructed by the participants.
Based on the analysis above, construction of Naive Bayes in PPDE can be attributed to the implementation of RSS completely. The amount of calculation and communication are linear with the number of participants, but has nothing to do with the sample size of each participant.
In addition to Naive Bayes, EM clustering model, K-Means clustering model etc. also can be constructed in PPDE based on RSS-RDM. At the same time, the sub-protocol used to construct the disturbed Summations in RSS-RDM can be utilized to construct k-nn [32] and decision tree classifier [31] . Repetitions will not be made here.
V. EXPERIMENTS
We design a serial experiments to test the result accuracy and efficiency of RSS-RMD in this section. In addition, based on data set ''nursery'' from UCI dataset, we also construct Naive Bayes classifier in PPDE using RSS-RMD to evaluate the performance of the method. Due to the limitation of number of computers, the experiment is conducted on one single computer (CPU: I5-7500, Memory: DDR4, 2400MHZ, and 4G). We first run all the necessary steps in sequence, and then divide the running time by the number of participants to estimate how long each participant takes. The time spent in message transmission is not considered. Unless otherwise stated, each experiment will be repeated 100 times, and take the average as the result.
A. PERFORMANCE OF RSS-RMD
In this section, two groups of experiments are done. The first is to check the time required by each participant, only considering the computation, to perform one time RSS-RMD protocol. The second is to test the result accuracy. Data required for the experiment is generated randomly within a certain range.
1) COMPUTATION TIME
Without considering the communication time, the main factors affecting implementation efficiency of RSS-RMD are the number of participants and the strength of encryption which is mainly determined by the length of Paillier key. so we will test the impact of number of participants with different length of key, i.e., 512, 1024, 1536, 2048 bits. It can be seen from figure 2 that when the other factors affecting efficiency of RSS-RMD are fixed, the number of participants versus the time consumed by each participant is approximately linear, which is consistent with our analysis. As such, it can be estimated that when the length of the Paillier key is 1024 bits, even if the number of participants reaches 100000, RSS-RMD can be completed within one hour regardless of the communication time. This is acceptable in practical applications.
2) ACCURACY OF RESULT
In our method, modifying the integral input in step1 is the key factor that affect the accuracy of result. There is no doubt that when the number of participants fixed, the larger the value of (x i , y i ) is, the smaller the difference err n = |
| is, where α i and α i are both random numbers with values between [−0.5, 0.5]. So, we just check the effect of number of participants n on value of err n . Fig.3 shows clearly that when the values of n i=1 (x i , y i ) are bigger than 0, the result will be closer to the true value of the ratio with the increase of the number of participants. That is to say, lim n→+∞ E(err n ) = 0, where E(err n ) is the mean of err n .
B. PERFORMANCE WHEN BUILDING MODEL IN PPDE
The purpose of designing RSS-RMD protocol is to construct some data mining models in PPDE, such as Naive Bayes classifier, K-Means clustering model, etc. In the following experiment, we take constructing Naive Bayes classifier in PPDE as an example to test the performance of our method. Some notations used in this section are detailed in table 3. 
1) EFFICIENCY OF BUILDING NAIVE BAYES CLASSIFIER BASED ON RSS-RMD
In order to construct Naive Bayes classifier in PPDE, participants need to cooperate to calculate the equations (25) and (26) For the data set ''nursery'', it has eight kinds of general attributes, and the number of possible value for each attribute is (3, 5, 4, 4, 3, 2, 3, 3) respectively. For the class attribute, there are 5 possible values. So, construction of Naive Bayes classifier on this sample set need to call RSS 140 times. Before experiment, we divide ''nursery'' into 100 sample sub-sets evenly, and then select n copies as the sample sets of the participants. In this experiment, for each given value of n, we repeat our method 10 times and take the average time to evaluate the efficiency. The result is shown in figure 4 . According to the result, we can see that compared with the time required for RSS-RMD, the time spent in construction of a Naive Bayes classifier is about 140 times of it when key length and number of participants are both the same.
2) RESULT ACCURACY OF NAIVE BAYES CLASSIFIER CONSTRUCTED BASED ON RSS-RMD
In this section, we will test the difference between Bayes Classifier built based on RSS-RMD and constructed directly over n i=1 D i . The difference here is defined as the ratio of number of testing samples with different classification result over the two classifiers to the amount of testing samples. Before our experiment, 20% of the data set ''nursery'' are selected as testing samples. Then, the remain are evenly divided into a specified number of groups, and n parts of them are randomly chosen as the participating data sites. There are only two samples in ''nursery'' whose class is ''recommend''. So, no such sample exists in many participating data sites. This means that for the most participants, the values of D In fig.5 , three curves indicate the relationship between error and the number of participant when training set is divided into 150, 180, and 200 parts respectively. As we can see from the figure, when the size of each participating data site is fixed, the error will become smaller and smaller with the increase of participant. At the same time, the three curves demonstrate that when the number of participants are fixed, the error is approximately inversely proportional to the size of each data site.
C. EXPERIMENT CONCLUSION
As the result shown above, the time spent by each participant in one implementation of RSS-RMD is acceptable. At the same time, the time versus the number of participants is approximately linear. So it is easy to estimate the time needed according to the number of parties. Since the construction of Naive Bayes classifier is equivalent to a certain number of executions of RSS-RMD, the time required can also be predicted easily, which is very useful in practical application. While for the accuracy, the result will be closer to the true value with the increase of number of participant if values of x i and y i are bigger than 0. Thus, as can be seen from the experiments above, our method for RSS is very practical.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new solution to the problem RSS based on the idea of multiplicative disturbance. Using our method, the participants can obtain the ratio by constructing disturbed summations R · n i=1 x i and R · n i=1 y i . Since the multiplier is generated based on rational number field F, it is impossible for any n − 1 parties to find the actual values of n i=1 x i and n i=1 y i . What is more, it is acceptable in terms of efficiency at the same time. In addition, our method also has many other advantages, for example, strong scalability, absolute fairness, and so on. Although our method is much improved in many aspect, there are still some shortcomings. For example, in many applications, x i or y i is known to be small integer, for example, 0, 1, etc. In this case, the value of n i=1 x i or n i=1 y i may be very small, and then the influence brought by modifying the inputs cannot be ignored. In addition, lots of Paillier encryption and decryption operations are required in our method, which leads to a significant cost, especial for high dimensional samples and large number of participants. Therefore, in our future research, we will do in-depth study on how to over the uncertainty due to small integer inputs. More importantly, we will try to find a more efficient homomorphic cryptosystem to replace the Paillier cryptosystem to further improve the efficiency of method for RSS.
